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I.  

INTRODUCTION

The remarkable success of international arbitration has caused anxiety in the common law world.
By taking cases away from courts, international arbitration causes a dearth of precedent in
certain areas of the law and is perceived as a threat to the healthy development of the law. This
article suggests that the cause could also be the cure: legal techniques used by international
arbitration practitioners, who routinely have to cope with a dearth of case law, might be what
common law practitioners need when deprived of precedents.
The argument unfolds as follows. Part II explains the effect of international arbitration on case
law. The success of international arbitration as a means of settling international commercial
disputes means that many disputes are transferred from courts to arbitration tribunals.
Additionally, the traditional confidentiality of international arbitration means that most arbitral
awards are not published. These two phenomena result in a severe dearth of precedent in certain
areas of the law where international arbitration is popular. We focus on three examples: the
construction industry; the excess insurance (and reinsurance) industry; and the oil and gas
industry.
Part III contrasts common and civil law reactions to this phenomenon and seeks to explain the
contrast. For common law jurists, the very success of arbitration is a threat to the healthy
development of the law. Its confidentiality adds insult to injury. By contrast, civil law jurists are
not concerned by the success of international arbitration; at most, they believe it would be useful
to reduce confidentiality. Different traditional concepts of law in these two legal traditions
explain the contrast between common law anxiety and civil law serenity.
Part IV discusses how, in our experience, international arbitration practitioners deal with a dearth
of precedent. This is a difficulty that they often face, and they have adopted certain legal
techniques to address it. We examine four in particular: reference to academic treatises and
other scholarly writings; a comparative approach; reliance on industry practice; and reasoning
from abstract principles.
Part V then raises the question whether precedent-deprived common law practitioners might
address the dearth of precedent by using similar techniques as international arbitration
practitioners employ. The question might seem incongruous. To show that it is not, we use the
example of U.S. courts facing issues of first impression—by definition issues on which no
precedent is available. We show that, at the margin, U.S. advocates and judges resort to similar
techniques.
We conclude that experience in international arbitration would indicate that, in precedentdeprived areas, common lawyers may be forced to amend their approach and the margin may
need to become the center. International arbitration is a cause of anxiety for common lawyers; it
may also offer the cure.
II.

THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ON CASE LAW

International arbitration is the dispute resolution method of choice in international trade. The
success of international arbitration as a means of settling international commercial disputes
means that many disputes that in the absence of international arbitration would be decided by
domestic judges are instead decided by international arbitrators. In other words, international
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arbitration has the effect of diminishing the amount of court precedents in the fields in which
arbitration is a popular method of dispute settlement. Additionally, the typical confidentiality of
international arbitration means that most arbitral awards are not published. These two
phenomena, taken together, result in a severe dearth of precedents, whether court precedents or
arbitral precedents, in certain areas of the law where arbitration is a popular method of dispute
settlement.
A.  

Arbitration is the Method of Choice for the Settlement of Disputes in
International Commerce

“International arbitration is now known to be ‘the’ ordinary and normal method of settling
disputes of international trade.”2 This observation, made in 1987 by the late Pierre Lalive, one of
the pioneers of international arbitration, rings even more true today. In particular, international
arbitration has become the method of choice for dispute resolution in certain industries when
operating on the international plane, such as major construction projects, excess insurance (and
reinsurance), and the oil and gas industry.3 Because arbitration proceedings are often
confidential,4 it is difficult to cite numbers to support these assertions. Klaus Peter Berger, a
German international arbitration scholar, has stated that 90% of international economic contracts
have an arbitration clause.5 This may be an exaggeration.6 But any suggestion that a “flight
from arbitration” is occurring7 is incorrect when it comes to international commerce. Data from
the major international arbitration institutions demonstrates a steady growth in the number of
disputes they administer.8
2

Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, in
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987)
(emphasis in the original).
3

See infra Part II.C.

4

See infra Part II.B.

5

Klaus Peter Berger, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (1993) (“About ninety
international economic contracts contain an arbitration clause.”).

percent of

6

See, e.g., GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 97 (2d ed. 2014) (“This figure lacks empirical
support and is almost certainly inflated: in reality, significant numbers of international commercial transactions –
certainly much more than 10% of all contracts – contain either forum selection clauses or no dispute resolution
provision at all.”).
7

Compare Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 D E P AUL L. R EV . 335, 336 (2007) (suggesting
that “sophisticated actors prefer litigation to arbitration”), and Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily
Sherwin, Arbitration Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. M ICH . J.L. R EFORM 871, 893 (2008) (concluding that “consumer arbitration clauses are used as a
means for avoiding aggregate dispute resolution”), with Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do
Businesses Use (and Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 O HIO S T . J. ON D ISP. R ESOL . 433, 435-36 (2010) (refuting
the conclusions of the above-quoted studies).
8

See TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH app. 1, at 341
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); see also B ORN , supra note 6, at 94.
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Several features of international arbitration explain its success in the settlement of disputes in
international commerce. Among the most often cited are neutrality, enforceability, flexibility,
and confidentiality. Indeed, in the international context, the actual and apparent neutrality of an
arbitral tribunal makes it, as compared to the domestic courts of each of the parties, “the only
game” or a “de facto monopoly.”9 The New York Convention10 makes recognition and
enforcement of international arbitration awards easier than the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.11 The flexibility of arbitration enables the parties to tailor the proceedings to
their specific needs.12 Finally, parties often value the confidentiality of international arbitration
proceedings.13
B.

The Confidentiality of International Arbitration

Confidentiality is traditionally viewed as a hallmark of international arbitration.14 It imposes an
obligation on the parties (and the arbitral tribunal and the arbitration institution) not to disclose
information concerning, or acquired in the course of, the arbitral proceedings. This traditional
regime of strong confidentiality is backed by default rules. In the absence of specific party
agreement on confidentiality, several national arbitration laws and arbitration rules provide for

9

Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, S TOCKHOLM INT ’L A RB . R EV ., 2008, at 1, 2 (neither
party wants the home courts of the other party to decide on the dispute).
10

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739.

11

ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 1.93, at 33 (5th ed. 2009) (“In
its international enforceability, an award also differs from the judgment of a court of law, since the international
treaties that govern the enforcement of an arbitral award (such as the New York Convention) have much greater
acceptance internationally than treaties for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments”); see John B. Bellinger, III &
R.   Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourism: The Case for a Federal Law on Foreign Judgment Recognition, 54 V IRG . J.
INT ’L L. 501 (2014) (describing the maze of statutory and common law rules governing the recognition of foreign
judgments in the United States and proposing a federal rule to promote uniformity and consistency). Attempts at
enacting a global convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have failed. See generally A
G LOBAL L AW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: L ESSONS FROM T HE H AGUE (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M.
Clermont eds., 2002); Bellinger & Anderson, supra at 529 (stating that “despite decades of negotiations, U.S.
officials have been unable to conclude a multilateral judgments agreement comparable to the New York
Convention” and summarizing these decades of failed negotiations).
12

REDFERN, supra note 11, § 1.95, at 33.

13

Id. § 1.96, at 33-34.

14

PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds. 2008); REDFERN, supra
note 11, § 2.145, at 136 (“The confidentiality of arbitral proceedings has traditionally been taken to be one of the
important advantages of arbitration.”); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Introductory Remarks, in PRECEDENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 17, 17 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds. 2008) (discussing “[t]he
traditional confidentiality of arbitration”).
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the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral award.15 Of most important
practical importance, none of the major arbitral institutions publishes copies of the arbitral
awards rendered under its auspices.16
The current trend in international arbitration is to “diminish, or at least question, the
confidentiality of arbitral proceedings as a whole.”17 This is particularly acute in the field of
international investment arbitration,18 but the same trend can be noted in relation to international
commercial arbitration. The ICC, for instance, deliberately decided not to include default
confidentiality obligations in its latest arbitration rules.19 Again, this push against confidentiality
and for more transparency operates at the level of default rules: in the absence of specific party
agreement on confidentiality, it is now typically suggested that no confidentiality obligation
should be implied.
15

The New Zealand arbitration statute provides for the confidentiality of arbitration. Arbitration Act 1996 §14B(1)
(N.Z.) (“Every arbitration agreement to which this section applies is deemed to provide that the parties and the
arbitral tribunal must not disclose confidential information.”). English courts have found a general principle of
confidentiality in English law. See R EDFERN , supra note 11, §§ 2.149-50, at 137 (citing to Ali Shipping Corp. v. ‘Shipyard
Trogir,’ [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 643; Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243; Dolling-Baker v.
Merrett, [1991] 2 All. E.R. 890). This principle is subject to limited exceptions. See Born, supra note 6, at 2794 n.61 (citing to
Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 184 (English Ct. App.); Milsom v. Mukhtar [2011] EWHC 955
(Ch) (English High Ct.)).. The UNCITRAL Model Law is silent on the question of confidentiality, as the drafters

considered that it was better to leave the issue to arbitration rules. See Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on
International and Commercial Arbitration: Present Situation and Future, 21 A RB . INT ’L 443 (2005). Some
arbitration rules provide for the confidentiality of the award. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 34(5)
(2010); LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 30 (2014); CPR Rules for Administered Arbitration of International Disputes, r.
20 (2014).
16

The International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) at times publishes
redacted portions of arbitral awards rendered under its auspices. But neither the ICC nor any other of the major
arbitral institutions administering international commercial and investment arbitration (the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), the London Court of
International Arbitration (“LCIA”), the International Center for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”), the Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), the Singapore International Arbitration Center
(“SIAC”), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (“HKIAC”)) systematically publishes arbitral awards
rendered under its auspices.
17

R EDFERN , supra note 11, § 2.152, at 138; see B ORN , supra note 6, at 2779-80 (“The confidentiality and privacy of
international arbitration proceedings is a contentious and unsettled subject.”).
18

See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014); United Nations
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Dec. 10, 2014, (the “Mauritius Convention
on Transparency”).
19

See ICC Rules of Arbitration, r. 22(3) (2012); Jason Fry et al., The Secretariat’s Guide to ICC Arbitration, ¶ 3-807
at 235 (2012) (“The Rules do not provide that the arbitration proceedings are confidential. Rather than creating a
general rule requiring the proceedings to be kept confidential and then attempting to define the exceptions that will
inevitably arise, the Rules take a more flexible and tailor-made approach, leaving the matter for the parties or the
arbitral tribunal to address in light of the specific circumstances of the case”). In addition, in recent years, several
national courts have found that the country’s arbitration law does not include an express or implied duty of
confidentiality. See, e.g., Esso Australia Res. Ltd v. Plowman, XXI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 137, 151 (Australian High Ct.
1995) (1996); Judgment of 27 October 2000, Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin. Inc., XXVI Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 291, 298 (Swedish S.Ct.) (2001).
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The fact remains, however, that, parties often agree that the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral
award are to be confidential, and many arbitration rules continue to contain a confidentiality
requirement.20 The current move away from confidentiality in international arbitration,
therefore, does not fundamentally alter our general assessment of the arbitral landscape in terms
of confidentiality. Most arbitration proceedings and awards are confidential. Even the ICC, for
instance, continues to publish only certain awards and then only in redacted form; and the same
remains through for most if not all other arbitral institutions. Proceedings and awards that
emerge, through official publication or leaks, are only the tip of the arbitral iceberg. Even when
awards do get published, they are not always easy to search or find.21
C.  

Dearth of Precedent in Areas of Law Where International Arbitration is the
Dispute Resolution Method of Choice

The success and confidentiality of international arbitration, taken together, mean that in certain
areas of the law, there is a severe dearth of precedent—be it judicial or arbitral. We focus below
on three industries where the dearth of relevant precedent is particularly striking – construction,
excess insurance, and oil and gas.
1.  

Construction

The FIDIC22 contracts are the most widely used standard forms of international construction
contract. Since the first FIDIC form was published in 1957, FIDIC contracts have provided for
the final settlement of disputes under the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC.23 As a result, there are
few court precedents directly interpreting the FIDIC contracts.24 What is true in particular of the
FIDIC contracts is true, though to a lesser degree, of construction disputes in general. To quote
the former Chief Justice of Canada:
The trend is clear. Fewer and fewer construction cases are reaching
the courts where the law is developed. Increasingly, instead of
being resolved by judges, construction disputes are being sent to

20

See supra note 16.

21

See generally S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20
AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 119 (2009).
22

“FIDIC” is the acronym for “Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs Conseils,” or International Federation of
Consulting Engineers. See About FIDIC, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS,
http://fidic.org/about-fidic (last visited on June 15, 2015).
23

Christopher R. Seppälä, The Development of a Case Law in Construction Disputes Relating to FIDIC Contracts,
in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 67, 67 (Yas Banifatemi ed., 2008).
24

Note that “English court decisions dealing with issues relevant to FIDIC contracts have been published, notably,
in Building Law Reports in England,” and that “the main published commentaries, in book form, on the FIDIC
contracts, are by British lawyers and engineers, and that they refer primarily to English case law precedent.” Id. at
71 n.2.
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mediation, arbitration,
resolution (ADR).25

or other forms of alternate

dispute

Construction contracts are complex, long-term contracts which give rise to many disputes. There
must have been hundreds, if not thousands, of arbitrations under the FIDIC contracts. It would
therefore not be unreasonable to assume that “if ever there was an area where an arbitration case
law should have developed, it would be in relation to the FIDIC contracts.”26 Such an
assumption, however, would be erroneous. In 2008, our colleague Christopher Seppälä, who for
many years acted as the legal advisor to FIDIC, set out to collect arbitration awards rendered in
arbitrations under a FIDIC contract. After reviewing all major international arbitration sources
as well as other sources,27 he identified only about 40 arbitral awards interpreting the FIDIC
contracts.28 Forty awards over a period of over fifty years of use of these contracts is not a lot,
and any practitioner with experience would agree that it is only a small sample of the awards that
must have been rendered during that time period.29
2.

Excess insurance (and Reinsurance)

Another striking domain for its dearth of precedent is excess insurance, and in particular excess
insurance disputes under the so-called “Bermuda Form.” The Bermuda Form is an excess
liability insurance form that was introduced to the commercial insurance market in 1985,
following the crisis of the excess liability insurance market in the United States in the mid-1980s,
and that has since “grown to be a mainstay policy option for large commercial policyholders,

25

Beverley McLachlin PC, Judging the “Vanishing Trial” in the Construction Industry, 2 FAULKNER L. REV. 315
(2011).
26

Seppälä, supra note 23, at 68.

27

Chris describes that he reviewed the collections of ICC awards (1974-2000), the ICCA Yearbook of Commercial
Arbitration (1976-2007), the ICC Bulletin, and the International Construction Law Review (1983-2007), as well as
the ASA Bulletin, Mealey’s and several other sources. Seppälä, supra note 23, at 69.
28

Id. Chris commented on some of these awards at Christopher R. Seppälä, International Construction Contract
Disputes: Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contracts, 9/2 ICC
B ULLETIN 32 (1998) (commenting on Extracts from ICC Awards, Construction Contracts Referring to the FIDIC
Conditions—Part I, 9/1 ICC B ULLETIN 74 (1998) and Extracts from ICC Awards, Construction Contracts Referring
to the FIDIC Conditions—Part II, 9/2 ICC B ULLETIN 46 (1998)).
29

Subsequently, at Chris’ behest, some more FIDIC awards have been published in the ICC Bulletin. See
Christopher R. Seppälä, International Construction Contract Disputes: Second Commentary on ICC Awards
Dealing Primarily with FIDIC Contracts, 19/2 ICC B ULLETIN 41 (2008) (commentary on 2008 extracts); Extracts
from ICC Arbitral Awards in International Construction Disputes, 19/2 ICC B ULLETIN 71 (2008); Christopher R.
Seppälä, International Construction Contract Disputes: Third Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing Primarily with
FIDIC Contracts, 23/2 ICC B ULLETIN 23 (2012) (commentary on 2012 extracts); Extracts from ICC Arbitral
Awards in International Construction Disputes, 23/2 ICC B ULLETIN 45 (2012); Christopher R. Seppälä,
International Construction Contract Disputes: Fourth Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing Primarily with FIDIC
Contracts, 24/2 ICC B ULLETIN 49 (2013) (commentary on 2013 extracts); Extracts from ICC Arbitral Awards in
International Construction Disputes, 24/2 ICC B ULLETIN 59 (2013).
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especially those with significant North American liability exposures.”30 Bermuda Form policies
are typically governed by New York law and provide for the final settlement of disputes by ad
hoc arbitration in London under the English Arbitration Act.31 As a result, the Bermuda Form is
“the subject of almost no significant reported decisions.”32
Given that New York law governs the Bermuda Form, many of the Bermuda Form’s clauses may
be interpreted on the basis of relevant New York precedent. Certain clauses, however, have no
equivalent in the insurance contracts typically interpreted by New York courts (one example is
the notion of “integrated occurrence”33). In these cases, there are no precedents directly on point,
even though hundreds of disputes have been arbitrated on the basis of policies written on the
Bermuda Form.
In a similar vein, many significant reinsurance disputes are settled by arbitration and the
resulting arbitral awards are almost never published. In the words of leading authors on English
reinsurance law:
One frustration . . . is the fact that some of the most illuminating
recent decisions in this field must remain confidential. . . . Some of
the finest judges and lawyers in the reinsurance field have
produced detailed arbitration awards in difficult areas of
reinsurance litigation, but the learning must remain hidden. . . . As
a result the majority of contested decisions are not available to the
researcher and the reinsurance wheel has to be reinvented time and
again.34
3.

Oil and Gas

According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”),
“there is a dearth of authority in New York relating to oil and gas leases.”35 Commentators go
30

DAVID SCOREY, RICHARD GEDDES & CHRIS HARRIS, THE BERMUDA FORM— INTERPRETATION AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION OF EXCESS LIABILITY ix (Oxford University Press, 2011).
31

See John Fellas, International Arbitration under the Bermuda Form, 8 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 129, 129 (2014).

32

RICHARD JACOBS QC, LORELIE S. MASTERS & PAUL STANLEY, LIABILITY INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION—THE BERMUDA FORM vii (2d ed. 2011) (calling this fact “an embarrassment to commercial
certainty” and adding that “[a] few reported cases exist, now, largely touching on tangential issues (such as the law
governing the arbitration clause)”).
33

S COREY , G EDDES & H ARRIS, supra note 30, at ¶ 8.25 at 146 (Oxford University Press, 2011) (“The overall point
to be taken is that New York law interpreting the scope of injuries and damages that may be swept within a single
occurrence has been driven by occurrence definitions that are significantly different, and more limited in scope, than
those appearing in the Bermuda Form”).
34

COLIN EDELMAN QC & ANDREW BURNS, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE x–xi (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2013).

35

Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 761 F.3d 221, 228 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)).
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further: “New York presents essentially a blank slate as to all significant oil and gas lease
issues.”36 The lack of court precedent in the field of oil and gas leases is so stark that the Second
Circuit recently took the highly unusual37 step of certifying questions of contract interpretation in
the context of oil and gas leases to the New York Court of Appeals (the highest state court).38
We have noted the dearth of New York law precedent in relation to oil and gas matters in our
own work. For instance, while so-called “take or pay” clauses are common in gas supply
contracts, when we handled a dispute regarding such a provision in an international arbitration,
we could find almost no New York case law on the matter. One explanation might be that New
York law is not often chosen for international oil and gas contracts; but in on our experience, this
is not the case. We believe the real reason is that the vast majority of international oil and gas
contracts contain an arbitration clause.
Construction, insurance, and oil and gas are three sectors involving numerous disputes, with
significant financial and legal stakes. This makes the dearth of precedent in these fields all the
more striking. This dearth of precedent has prompted different reactions among civil law and
common law jurists.39
III.

CONTRASTING COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW REACTIONS TO THE
DEARTH OF PRECEDENT

Common law and civil law jurists react very differently to the above-described phenomenon.
Many common law jurists see in arbitration a threat to the healthy development of the law. The
very existence of arbitration is a source of anxiety for them, and arbitration’s confidentiality only
adds insult to injury. For civil law jurists, by contrast, arbitration is not a cause for great
concern. Some push for more transparency and for the publication of arbitration awards. But
this is not because they think that the healthy development of the law demands it, but simply
because, all things being equal, some guidance is better than no guidance. This section describes
and explains the contrast between this common law anxiety and civil law serenity.
36

George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus Shale States, 4 T EX . J. O IL
G AS E NERGY L. 155, 191 (2008–2009); see also id. at 157 (asking “how does one comply with the law of a state
when it has very limited oil and gas jurisprudence, and its most recent leading cases are over one hundred years
old?”).
37

761 F.3d at 228 (acknowledging that the case turned on “questions of contract interpretation that may not be the
typical material for certification”).

38

See id. at 232 (The court certified two questions. First, “[u]nder New York law, and in the context of an oil and
gas lease, did the State’s Moratorium [on the use of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing]
amount to a force majeure event?” Second, “[i]f so, does the force majeure clause modify the habendum clause and
extend the primary terms of the leases?”) (emphasis in the original). The New York Court of Appeals answered only
the second question. See Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 31 N.E.3d 80, 85-86 (2015) (answering the second
question in the negative and declining to answer the first question because it was, consequently, “academic”).
39

“‘Common law’ and ‘civil law’ refer not to specific systems, but are instead used as ideal types.” CATHERINE A.
ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12 (2014) (citing to MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE
AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 130 n.60 (1986)). On the usefulness
and limitations of these ideal types, see R OGERS, supra.
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A.  

Common Law Anxiety and Civil Law Serenity
1.  

Common Law Anxiety

The dearth of precedent caused in certain areas of the law by the success and confidentiality of
international arbitration has led to a significant amount of commentary by common law
practitioners. One point in particular comes back with regularity, from all corners of the
common law world: the dearth of precedent caused by international arbitration is perceived as a
pathological phenomenon endangering the healthy development of the common law.
Common law judges have given voice to this anxiety. Thus, for instance, Beverley McLachlin,
the former Chief Justice of Canada, with specific reference to the construction industry, warns:
“court decisions, over the years, build up a settled legal framework against which contracts can
be drawn and disputes settled, whatever the forum.”40 Talking of ADR, she asserts in a striking
metaphor: “The living tree of the law finds little nourishment in such arid soil. The age-old
fruits of the law – helping people predict the probable outcomes of their actions and to modify
their behavior intelligently – do not grow.”41
Common law scholars have also joined the chorus. For instance, Kenneth Abraham, a prominent
insurance law scholar in the United States, in an article focusing on the use of binding arbitration
for the resolution of insurance disputes, states: “This lawlessness [of arbitration] not only
adversely affects the parties to each dispute, but the legal system as a whole.”42 Further,
“[b]ecause arbitrations are essentially confidential and set no precedents, they lack an important
feature of the rule of law: each arbitration is an island unto itself, not governed by any prior
arbitration outcomes and incapable of having an effect on any future arbitration.”43
This anxious concern for a healthy development of the law is even one of the reasons for a
famous international arbitration “oddity” – Section 69 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act,
which provides for the possibility of appeals on questions of English law. Thus, according to a
distinguished English practitioner, “[i]t remains unthinkable that the symbiotic link should be
broken between commercial arbitration, the development of the English law and the English
Commercial Court.”44 The symbiotic and organic link between the law courts and the law is thus
maintained by the possibility of appealing arbitration awards on questions of English law.
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For the common lawyer, the real source of anxiety is not the confidentiality of international
arbitration, but international arbitration itself. The common law is developed by the courts, and
international arbitration (and alternative dispute resolution in general) takes cases away from the
courts. Even if international arbitration awards were published, the problem would remain:
because arbitral awards, unlike court precedents, cannot be the building blocks of the common
law edifice, the success of international arbitration, confidential or not, endangers the
development of the law. Justice McLachlin makes this very clear:
In the area of construction law, the operative legal principles are
not set out in any Code. Rather, they have been developed, and
must continue to develop, through the common law as applied by
the courts. It thus emerges that even in a world dominated by
ADR, the courts are essential. They, and they alone, can discharge
the task of norm-setting.45
2.

Civil Law Serenity

Civil lawyers do not suffer from the same anxiety as their common law colleagues. For them,
the cause for concern is not international arbitration (or alternative dispute resolution) itself, but
only its confidentiality.
Some, like the French practitioner Alexis Mourre, push for the publication of awards. In a piece
on this topic, Mourre concludes: “the public interest in the development of arbitral case law, in
the enhancement of the quality of arbitration, and in providing transparency and predictability to
the business community overrides the principle of confidentiality as far as the publication of
arbitration awards is concerned.”46 One sees here something analogous to the anxieties of the
common law scholars, discussed above. But the emphasis is different. The common law critics
are concerned that “the law” is endangered by arbitration: arbitration kills the tree of the law,
arbitration is an island and is isolated from the rest of the law. Mourre’s concern instead is for
international arbitration itself: he refers to the “enhancement of the quality of arbitration” and
“the public interest in the development of arbitral case law.” In short, where the common law
critics see in arbitration a danger for the common law that needs to be addressed or eliminated,
Mourre sees a missed opportunity for the law of international arbitration. While many common
law critics come to the conclusion that the problem is arbitration and there should be less of it,
Mourre suggests that the problem is confidentiality, and argues that there should be less
confidentiality so that there is even more and better arbitration.
Other civil law scholars are even less concerned than Mourre. In an article on the legitimacy of
international arbitration, Professor Pierre Tercier, a Swiss jurist, concludes that international
arbitration derives legitimacy from “the coherence of published decisions” and “the community
of arbitrators.” He notes that the publication of awards “makes them subject to control: not by
45
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hierarchical authorities, but by other professionals and scholars.”47 Worries about the erosion of
the law do not appear.
Another example is found in an article by Professor Jean-Michel Jacquet, a respected French
jurist. His article, tellingly, is entitled: “Do we need an arbitral case law?”48 He believes we do,
but still strikes a very optimistic note: “The decisions of arbitral tribunals are more and more
known, and are frequently cited and analysed. There is no doubt as to the usefulness of such a
body of reported decisions, since this provides greater certainty.”49
It is of course easier to prove that something exists than to prove that it does not exist. With this
caveat in mind, it is submitted that one would have great difficulty finding a civil law lawyer, say
a Belgian or French lawyer, arguing that the growth of international arbitration endangers the
well-being of the droit des obligations (contract law). Civil lawyers push for the publication of
international arbitration awards, not for the sake of the healthy development of the law, but as a
form of guidance for the arbitrators themselves.
B.

The Cause of the Contrast: Different Concepts of Law

The reason for these different reactions lies in different concepts of what law is. The success of
international arbitration and the resulting dearth of precedent affect traditional concepts of law
differently, and lawyers from civil law and common law traditions react accordingly.
For the civil lawyer, the legislature alone makes law, and the judiciary applies it.50 This
principle in turn requires that legislation be “complete, coherent, and clear;”51 for if it is not,
judges might have to make law (and not just apply it) when faced with a gap, a contradiction, or
an ambiguity. The Code, and in particular the “iconic”52 Napoleonic Code Civil, is the
embodiment of that ideal. Of course, that ideal is unattainable. However complete, coherent,
and clear, codes need to be interpreted. This is why “[t]he teacher-scholar is the real protagonist
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of the civil law tradition” and “[t]he civil law is a law of the professors.”53 Civil law scholars
elaborate on the Code and build conceptual cathedrals to approximate the civil law ideal of
completeness, coherence, and clearness. This is what the comparative law scholar Mirjan
Damaška has called “the Continental grammar of law.”54 This scholarly legal architecture is
generally accepted by the legal profession and has a profound influence on the development of
the law.55 Legal reasoning is essentially deductive, descending from the Code provisions,
through abstract and refined conceptual distinctions, to the facts. Judges, at least in theory, only
apply the law to the facts of the case.56 “The net image is of judges as operators of a machine
designed and built by legislators.”57 The judge is the anonymous applier of the law. “[W]ho
knows the name of a civil law judge?”58 A corollary to this theory of judging is that court
decisions are not law, but simply application of law to facts. There is no (formal) doctrine of
precedent in civil law.59 In fact, in many civil law countries, court decisions are not published or
they are quite difficult to find.
For the common lawyer, by contrast, law is essentially judge-made case law.60 The law grows
organically,61 by the accretion of decided cases, bound together by the doctrine of stare decisis.62
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The judge is the central figure of the common law.63 In contrast with the anonymous civil law
judge, common law judges are “culture heroes, even parental figures.”64 Legal reasoning is
essentially pragmatic and inductive, ascending from facts to principles.65 One illustrious
sentence summarizes the essentially pragmatic and concrete nature of the common law: “The
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”66
Civil lawyers find this aphorism perplexing. The reaction of André Tunc, a French scholar, is
representative:
If there is a sentence which a French lawyer has great difficulty in
understanding, it is Holmes’ famous saying: “The life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.” It is questionable
whether the opposition between logic and experience has any
justification. Exact sciences are equally based on experience and
on logic. To deny that the world is governed by rules making a
coherent whole would amount to asserting that it is chaotic, an
unduly sinister view.67
Tunc’s reaction illustrates another crucial aspect of the civil law/common law divide: diverging
levels of tolerance for uncertainty. To him, the common law approach runs the risk of being
“chaotic.” The civil law is profoundly adverse to uncertainty, which it sees as lawlessness in
disguise.68 In French law for instance, “la sécurité juridique” or “legal security”—which
designates at the same time the intelligibility, predictability and stability of the law—is regarded
as an essential feature of the rule of law.69 The common law, on the other hand, tolerates a
remarkably high level of uncertainty. Numerous questions are unsettled. Decided cases can
remove the uncertainty, but they need to be numerous, published and readily accessible. It is
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expected that several decided cases will result in the possibility to enunciate a general
principle.70 The whole system thus rests on a steady stream of decided cases. If the cases
disappear, the system collapses. Although the common law tolerates more uncertainty than the
civil law, it demands, like any system of law, a minimum level of certainty.71 Without cases, the
common law presents too much uncertainty for anyone to bear.
These contrasting traditional concepts of law, and their corresponding diverging tolerance for
uncertainty, explain the contrast between, on the one hand, the anxiety of common lawyers about
the success and confidentiality of arbitration, and on the other hand, the relative serenity of civil
lawyers.
For the common lawyer, arbitration endangers the common law because it takes cases away from
the courts, and thus reduces the stream of cases that a minimum level of certainty requires.
Confidentiality adds insult to injury. But even if arbitration awards were not confidential, the
problem would remain. Judges, not arbitrators, build the edifice of the common law. For the
civil lawyer, by contrast, the fact that courts decide less cases is not a cause for concern. Judges
do not make law; they simply apply it. Certainty is not the result of a long accumulation of
cases; it rests on the achievement of the Code’s original designers, and the subtle elaborations of
its exegetes. All things being equal, publication of arbitration awards is desirable, because
guidance is helpful (though not necessary). Confidentiality may be criticized; but the existence
of arbitration itself is not a cause for concern.
Now that we have a better understanding of how and why different legal traditions react
differently to international arbitration, let us turn to how the dearth of precedent in industries
prone to international arbitration has influenced the practice of international arbitration, with
particular emphasis on legal reasoning.
IV.

HOW INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTITIONERS DEAL WITH THE
DEARTH OF PRECEDENT

International arbitration practitioners often have to deal with a dearth of precedent. This section
discusses how, in our experience, they do it. Four techniques in particular come to mind:
reference to academic treatises and other scholarly writings; a comparative approach; reliance on
industry practice; and reasoning from abstract principles.
A.  

Reference to Academic Treatises and Other Scholarly Writings

A first technique that is prevalent in international arbitration is reference to academic treatises
and other scholarly writings. Recourse to scholarly works is particularly prevalent in relation to
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questions of arbitral procedure.72 But it is also common regarding the substantive merits of the
dispute.
In an international construction arbitration, for example, one would be remiss not to make
reference to the seminal treatises on the FIDIC forms of contract: Nael Bunni, The FIDIC Forms
of Contract (2005); I.N. Duncan Wallace, The International Civil Engineering Contract (1974,
1980); E.C. Corbett, FIDIC 4th—A Practical Legual Guide (1991); and J. Glover & S. Hughes,
Understanding the New FIDIC Red Book: A Clause by Clause Commentary (2006).73
Similarly, in international arbitrations arising out of a Bermuda Form insurance contract, insurers
and policyholders rely heavily on the two major scholarly commentaries on the Bermuda Form:
Richard Jacobs QC, Lorelie S Masters, Paul Stanley, Liability Insurance in International
Arbitration—The Bermuda Form (2d ed. 2011) and David Scorey, Richard Geddes, Chris Harris,
The Bermuda Form—Interpretation and Dispute Resolution of Excess Liability Insurance
(2011). The Jacobs treatise generally takes a pro-policyholder position, while the Scorey treatise
tends to be pro-insurer.
In oil and gas arbitration, reference is often made to, for instance, Howard R. Williams &
Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law (2003 ed.).
B.

Comparative Approach

A second feature of advocacy in international arbitration is the use of a comparative approach.
Emmanuel Gaillard, a distinguished scholar and practitioner of international arbitration, explains
that, because of the systematic lack of precedent directly on point in international arbitration, a
sort of “instinctive” comparative law method is omnipresent:
Of course, arbitration practitioners invoke decisions that support
the argument they wish to convince the arbitral tribunal of in
exactly the same way as arbitrators will refer to what other
arbitrators have done before them whenever they have access to
such arbitral precedents. Very often, this practice goes beyond the
relevant applicable law of the dispute. It is almost second nature to
invoke arbitral awards in support of one’s argument, without even
giving a second thought to the applicable law of the award that one
is invoking.74
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Christopher Seppälä tells the story of an ICC construction arbitration that illustrates the
importance of the comparative approach in international arbitration.75 In that case, the governing
law was “that of an Arab country with an undeveloped law.”76 The dispute related to a project to
build a town. The employer had let the works out to three different contractors under three
different main construction contracts (so-called “multi-prime” construction contracts). The
question arose: what duty does an employer owe to its various prime contractors in the case of a
multi-prime construction project where no provision is made for coordination of the performance
of the work among the contractors by the employer? Unsurprisingly, the substantive applicable
law did not address the issue. According to Chris:
[W]e, as counsel to the contractor, undertook some research in
comparative law and discovered that the law relating to the rights
and duties of owners and contractors in multi-prime construction
contract situations, though not much developed in Europe (e.g., in
England or France), is highly developed in the United States.
[…]
The U.S. case law made clear that even where nothing is specified
in the relevant construction contracts, where an owner has entered
into multiple prime construction contracts whose performance can
impact the performance of others, the owner has an implied
affirmative duty to coordinate those contracts and to limit the risk
that performance under one will or may prevent or hinder
performance under another.77
Chris recounts next how the arbitral tribunal, composed of two Arab lawyers (including one from
the country of the governing law) and one English Queen’s Counsel, “expressed relief at the
hearing that concrete expression had been found” as to the concrete issue they faced.78 The
tribunal even cited to passages from the relevant U.S. cases in its award.
C.

Reliance on Industry Practice

A third common feature of advocacy in international arbitration is the reliance on industry
practice and general principles recognized in the industry.
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In fact, one of the attractive features of arbitration is that, for disputes involving a technical or
otherwise specialized field, the parties can appoint arbitrators with the relevant expertise or
experience, who usually will be attuned and receptive to such arguments.79
The term lex mercatoria – a term of art in the international arbitration world for decades – has
given rise to much intellectual debate,80 which is not the purview of this brief article. It suffices
to note that the term’s existence and continued appeal demonstrate that contemporary
international arbitration practice shares with the “law merchant” of old81 a recognition that when
deciding disputes in international trade, it is relevant to consider practices that are generally
accepted in the relevant trade. One can also observe the development of bodies of principles
accepted in a given industry, such as a “lex petrolea” in the oil and gas industry82 or a “lex
sportiva” in sports cases.83 Finally, parties and arbitrators often rely on “trade usages” in arguing
for their position and in justifying their decisions.84
In particular, Article 28(4) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that “in all cases, the arbitral
tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the
usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.”85 Similarly, Article 35(3) of the 2010
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that “[i]n all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in
accordance with the terms of the contract, if any, and shall take into account any usage of trade
applicable to the transaction.”86 In the words of one commentator:
Unlike some national laws that treat usages as secondary sources
of law, international commercial law confers trade usages a more
79
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active role compared to those national legal systems. This active
and significant role materializes in two different ways. Firstly,
trade usages may be recognized as a part of the contract between
the parties, where governing law permits such an application,
under the “implied terms” doctrine that governs the common law
jurisdictions. Secondly, international arbitration rules may provide
that arbitrators shall, along with the national and/or a-national
substantive rules applicable to the merits of the dispute, take into
account the trade usages relevant with the transaction.87
D.

Reasoning from Abstract Principles

Finally, international arbitration practitioners often make arguments based on abstract
principles.88 A manifestation of this tendency is the reference to Latin maxims such as nemo
auditur turpitudinem suam allegans – no one can use his own wrongdoing in his favor – or pacta
sunt servanda – one must abide by one’s agreements. International arbitration practitioners often
refer to these maxims without feeling the need to support them with another authority (such as a
case endorsing them, for instance); the principles are intrinsically authoritative.
V.

COULD
THE EXPERIENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
PRACTITIONERS BE OF USE TO THE COMMON LAW PRACTIONER?

The techniques on which international arbitration practitioners rely when facing a dearth of
precedent tend to stem from the civil law. Recourse to treatises and other scholarly writings, for
instance, is a quintessential civil law technique. In the civil law, as explained above, the
“doctrine” – a term that intriguingly for the common lawyer designates at the same time the
community of respected scholars and the body of scholarship they produce89 – has a significant
influence on the development of the law.90 And while the comparative approach is not unique to
the civil law system, it has been conceptualized and studied more by civil lawyers.91 Reliance on
87
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abstract principles is another hallmark of civil law reasoning which, as explained above,92 is
quintessentially deductive.93
Might the experience of international arbitration practitioners nonetheless be of use to the
common law practitioner facing a dearth of precedent? The question might seem strange, even
shocking; but upon closer examination it is not revolutionary. In fact, we observe that U.S.
advocates and judges, at the margin, when facing “issues of first impression”—by definition
issues on which no precedent is available—deploy the very same techniques.94
This is well illustrated by two recent New York cases, one federal and one state, relating to New
York’s moratorium on high-volume hydraulic fracturing. In Wiser v. Enervest Operating L.L.C.,
the Northern District of New York found that the occurrence of the New York state moratorium
during the primary term of oil and gas leases but prior to commencement of drilling did not end
the requirement to make delay rental payments, and held that the lessees’ failure to make the
required payments resulted in automatic termination of the leases.95 In Beardslee v. Inflection
Energy LLC, the New York Court of Appeals, answering a certified question from the Second
Circuit, held that the force majeure clause in oil and gas leases did not modify the habendum
clause in the leases and therefore did not extend their primary terms.96 In making these
decisions, the courts used a comparative approach and relied on academic works and the industry
practice – three of the four techniques on which international arbitration practitioners rely.
As to the comparative approach, for example, the Wiser court stated:
There is a dearth of authority in New York relating to oil and gas
leases such as those now at issue. Both sides to this litigation have
therefore identified cases from other jurisdictions where the law
concerning such leases is far more developed, though not
necessarily uniform, and have asked that the court draw upon the
principles emanating from those cases.97
The court proceeded to cite abundantly to decisions from other U.S. jurisdictions and discussed
several of them.98 Similarly, in Beardslee, in reaching its conclusion that the force majeure
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clause did not extend the primary terms of the leases, the New York Court of Appeals noted that
its holding was “consistent with out-of-state ‘oil’ jurisdictions.”99 It cited and discussed cases
decided by its “sister courts,”100 notably Texas and California courts.
Both courts also relied on scholarly works. The Wiser court referred to numerous oil and gas
treatises: Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law (2003 ed.); W.L.
Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas (Perm. ed. 1959); Nancy Saint–Paul, Summers Oil & Gas (3d
ed.); and Eugene O. Kuntz, Oil and Gas (1967). The Beardslee Court also referred to two of
these,101 to support its assertion that “an agreement for the production of oil and gas must be
construed with reference to both the intention of the parties and the known practices within the
industry.”102
As can be seen from this last quote, in Beardslee, the New York Court of Appeals relied on
generally recognized industry practices. The Wiser Court also relied on industry practice. The
Court stated that “an understanding of the development of the industry is critical when
construing the terms of an oil and gas lease.”103 It proceeded to present a detailed discussion of
the “historical context” of delay rental provisions in oil and gas leases, relying on decisions from
other jurisdictions and on scholarly works.104 It stated that its conclusion that the leases
terminate automatically in the event that the lessor fails to commence drilling of a well or to pay
delay rentals timely within the primary term of the leases was supported by “the clear and
unequivocal terms of the leases in issue, as universally understood in the oil and gas
industry.”105
And while the Wiser and Beardslee courts did not rely on abstract principles of law, other U.S.
courts have done so when facing issues of first impression. A locus classicus of legal theory in
the United States—Riggs v. Palmer106—illustrates this well. Elmer murdered his grandfather to
prevent him from changing certain provisions in his will that were favorable to Elmer. The
question was whether Elmer could inherit from his grandfather. Nothing in the relevant statutes
prohibited it. The majority of the court nonetheless held that Elmer could not inherit. In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
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[A]ll laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their
operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the
common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own
crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their
foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries,
and have nowhere been superseded by statutes.107
In sum, in those rare cases when they are faced with issues of first impression, U.S. courts and
advocates resort to the same techniques that international arbitration practitioners, who are often
faced with such issues, routinely employ.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The dearth of precedent that international arbitration sometimes causes has generated anxiety in
some common law quarters. But what brings the harm might also bring the cure: common law
practitioners may find inspiration in the techniques used by international arbitration practitioners
who are often faced with a lack of precedent. While these techniques are more typical of the
civil lawyer’s toolkit, U.S. litigators and judges do at times employ them, but only at the
margins, when dealing with issues of first impression. Experience in international arbitration
indicates that in the areas of dearth, for instance in those cases in international commerce that
still reach the common law courts, common lawyers may be forced to expand their toolkit and
the margin may need to become the center.
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